From A Greek Debt Crisis To A Eurozone Structural One?

When we look back five years from now, will we see this week as marking a turning point in the short, but far from uneventful, ten year history of Europe’s common currency? Certainly recent comments by the deputy governor of the People's Bank of China have made evident what was already implicit: the dependence of EU sovereign debt on sentiment in global markets, especially in Asia and the Americas. Simon Derrick, chief currency strategist at Bank of New York Mellon even went so far as to say the trauma of recent days might well signal the point that we stop talking about a “Greek debt crisis” and start talking about a “Eurozone structural crisis” . And while Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, was telling us on the one hand that the eurozone will never let Greece fail, Jane Foley, research director at Forex.com busied herself explaining, on the other, that any involvement of the International Monetary Fund in helping Greece to stabilise its fiscal position only heightens the risk that the country might one day end up leaving the eurozone. So just where are we at this point?

Basically it is important to recognise that the current crisis has placed the spotlight on the severe institutional weaknesses which lie underpin the common currency, and it is just these weaknesses which are leading so many commentators to now ask themselves whether it might not have been easier to implement political union in Europe before embarking on such an ambitious monetary experiment.

These weaknesses became even more clear on Thursday when Jean Claude Trichet went very public in making clear that he personally is totally opposed to IMF participation in any Greece "rescue". “If the IMF or any other authority exercises any responsibility instead of the eurogroup, instead of the governments, this would clearly be very, very bad,” he said on France’s Public Senat television. And this on the same day as Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy were publicly celebrating the triumph of the "Franco-German" entente. Clearly there are still many rivers left to cross before we can say we have reached the other side in this particular structural crisis.

Basically the issues facing Greece are now not primarily fiscal ones. The issue is how to get growth back into the economy fast enough to stop deflation and the economic contraction taking away all the good work acheived through fiscal cutbacks, and how to finance Greek borrowing at a rate of interest which stops the level of indebtedness spiralling upwards out of control.

The Economist magazine have done their own calculation on this, and they estimate that a loan of €75 billion rather than the currently rumoured €25 billion will be needed and that the country is likely to need five years (rather than three) to get its deficit down below 3% of GDP. They also assume that Greek GDP will be 5% below its current level by 2014. Obviously the output you get in these sort of calculations rather depend on the expectations you put in, but these are not unrealistic expectations.

As I explain in this post on the debt snowball problem, only two things really matter at this stage, the rate of change in nominal Greek GDP (that is non price adjusted) and the rate of interest charged on the sovereign debt. As regards nominal GDP, the Economist assume a 5% contraction in 2010. This may seem rather steep, but it does include an anticipated fall in prices as well as a drop in GDP. My own calculations suggest a drop in real GDP of about two percent, rather than the somewhat higher numbers others are talking about. I suggest this number is more realistic given the degree to which the trade deficit is likely to correct, and the net trade impact on headline GDP numbers.





As far as prices goes, I think a one percent fall in the CPI is a reasonable guess at this stage. If you look at the chart below you will see that interannual Greek inflation is still well above the EU 16 average, but prices have now been falling since November, and even though we shouldn't neglect the impact of tax and public sector tariff increases, prices will almost certainly be down in December 2010 over January. The big difficulty is estimating by how much.



One of the key issues facing Greece at the moment, with large parts of its outsanding debt needing to be refinanced, is just what rate of interest (or extra spread) will have to be paid on any loan (I deal with this question in this post). This is almost a key question, since it can become a "life or death" issue in determining whether or not the country will be forced into default. But here both the EU and the IMF have a problem, since if the Euro Group countries make a loan at a level near to the the current price charged for German debt (which is what should happen if we argue Greek debt carries no additional risk since we are all guaranteeing it), then other countries who are currently paying more (Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Austria etc) may ask why they also could not have such favourable treatment. On the other hand, asking the IMF to make a cheaper loan causes problems, since it could be seen as subsidising Europe in sorting out its problems, and this might not be easily understood in Emerging Economies where there are evidently many more needy cases than Greece's to think about.

The bottom line is that there is no easy answer here, and Europe is struggling to convince the rest of the world that it has both the will and the instruments to effectively tackle the problem of maintaining a single currency in a diverse group of countries. Herman Van Rompuy said on Friday there was no danger of Portugal being sucked into the same sort of debt whirlpool as Greece, and that Portugal would not be the next country to be sent over to Washington in search of a helping technical hand from the IMF. Which raises the question: if it won't be Portugal, who will it be?

Why Not Unravel The IMF Too While We're At It?

If you're really good at making a pigs ear of things, why not join the EU? Of course, this is not meant as a piece of solid advice, rather it is a cry of frustration at being impotently forced to watch so many things done so badly, each in turn, and one after the other. Southern Europe's problem is essentially a competitiveness problem, and not a fiscal one, and if many states have been having growing difficulty with their negative fiscal balances, this is a symptom of the problem, and not its cause. Even in the worst of cases - countries like Greece and Portugal - the rising recourse to fiscal outlays has been a response to lack of "healthy" growth, and the root cause of this continuing difficulty in generating real growth has been the underlying lack of competitiveness, and the inability to export your way out of trouble once the burden of debt starts to rise, so simply pruning the fiscal side isn't going to cure the problem, and by now that simple point should be obvious, I would have thought.

Naturally a lot of financial markets attention has been focusing recently on whether or not the Euro is about to unravel. Even the ever-so-prudent Ralph Atkins winds up his mamoth "Defiant Berlin" review with a quote from Jörg Krämer, chief economist at Commerzbank in Frankfurt who says the next few years may see the eurozone becoming more of a “transfer union”, one in which better performing countries have to help out weaker members. “That" - he argues - "could mean Germany says, ‘we are no longer willing to support the weaker parts of the EU’, while the Greeks say that they are not prepared to have policy dictated by the Germans," Thus: “The risk cannot be totally excluded of a eurozone break-up within 10 to 15 years – and this is a consequence of widening eurozone divergences.” To which Atkins adds "If that risk rose, Europe would be facing a very different ballgame". You bet it would!

To some extent I cannot help feeling that a congenital inability to take bite-the-bullet type decisions is resulting in an ongoing process of passing the buck ever onwards and upwards. The latest exemple here is the issue of IMF involvement in the Greek adjustment process. Now, as with any issue, there are good reasons and there are bad reasons why IMF involvemnet might be considered desireable. Among the good reasons are the vast experience and technical expertise of the fund, or the fact that representatives of the IMF might find it easier to say "no", given that the underlying sovereignty issues are not exactly identical when posed in terms of the IMF as they are in terms of the EU.

But among the bad reasons would be the idea that the IMF could fund any eventual Greek loan more cheaply. As far as I can see, a lot of the EU interest in having an IMF loan to Greece stems from the need to make the rate of interest applied cheap enough to bring the spread down. This is an important concern, since it is not obvious why a country which is making its best effort to put things straight should need to be paying an exorbitant charge for the money it borrows while it does this. Earlier this week European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet spoke out strongly against offering the kind of low-interest loans for which the Greek government has been pressing - “There shouldn’t be any subsidy element, no concessionary element” in any eventual loan to Greece, he told members of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. And maybe this is the only reasonable position the ECB can take (given its Charter), but evidently the Eurogroup of countries are not bound by the same constraints and they themselves could do this (via recourse to Group-backed EuroGroup bonds, or whatever), which raises the obvious question: why don't they?

Well, one of the reasons lying behind all the reluctance we are currently seeing may not be the issue of the German constitution, or even the question of changes to the Lisbon Treaty, or any of the major issues of principal which arise and would require lengthy and onerous debate. Maybe the question is a much more simple one: perhaps Europe's leaders are simply worried that if they make a cheap loan to Greece, then Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Slovenia and Slovakia may all soon argue they also need one.

My view is that this is an issue where the EU itself needs to bite the bullet, and make large changes, ones which lead, as Wolfgang Munchau has been arguing, to much closer political union. If we need the IMF in Greece, and I think we do, it is for its proven capacity to implement programmes, and its extensive technical resources, NOT for the money.

Indeed the Indian economist Subroto Roy just raised a very important issue in this regard on my Facebook. If IMF funds are used to bailout Greece, wouldn't that be a bit like the poor pampering the rich. Shouldn't IMF money be being used for other things? Shouldn't the IMF have other priorities? Evidently stabilising Europe is important, but shouldn't the EU be doing that (and not just as a matter of pride, as a matter of international solidarity)? As Roy asks, what happens if...

"the US, Britain, ANZ and everyone else in the IMF who is not in the Eurozone.... (decide to)... legitimately ask why the effective subsidy of Greece by its Eurozone partners should be transferred to the rest of the world ... (after all) .... the Europeans have enough clout in the IMF to, say, insist some of their own IMF-directed resources be directed towards Greece specifically, which would spell the unravelling of the IMF if it became a general habit."

Exactly.

On a slightly different, but somewhat related topic, I basically agree with a lot of what Martin Wolf wrote in his Excessive Virtue piece in the FT yesterday. As Martin points out, in saying "nein" to those who suggest that its economy should become a little less competitive what the German government is effectively saying is that the eurozone must become some kind of greater Germany - a huge export machine which generates a massive surplus with the rest of the world, a surplus which enables all those highly indebted member countries to pay down their debts. But, as Wolf argues, this policy would have profoundly negative implications for the entire world economy.

He cites the German secretary of state Ulrich Wilhelm, who, in a letter to the FT, argues that:

“The key to correcting imbalances in the eurozone and restoring fiscal stability lies in raising the competitiveness of Europe as a whole. The more countries with current account deficits are able to increase their competitiveness, the easier they will find it to decrease their public and foreign trade deficits. A less stability-oriented policy in Germany would damage the eurozone as a whole.”

This worries Wolf, who argues that Mr Wilhelm is inviting everybody to join a zero-sum world of beggar-my-neighbour policies in which every country tries to grab market share from the rest (strange how all of this sounds very similar to the way things wound up back in the 1930's, now isn't it?). As he suggests, at a time of generalised global weakness, this is a self-defeating recommendation for both the eurozone and the world. If we take a look at Japanese exports, which after an initial surge, are basically now near enough to being stationary, it is obvious that deficient aggregate demand in Europe is now part of the problem:



And obviously with all the fiscal pruning and "good housekeeping" we are now about to see, this problem is set to get worse, not better. Being well apprised of the problem Wolf then goes on to put forward an alternative:

"An alternative solution might be to help the world absorb larger export surpluses from the eurozone, the US, Japan and the UK. True, no sustainable exit from the present quagmire can be envisaged without increased net capital flows into emerging countries. It also seems evident that this is where the world’s surplus savings ought to end up. But it is going to take time and much reform to make this happen."

Really, I entirely agree, but a quantum leap in thinking is necessary here. If the books are to balance - and if we want growth and pensions in the OECD then they have to - what we need to do is help cheaper finance reach those countries with capacities to grow and absorb others exports, while the EU takes on in-house responsibility for sorting out the financing (but not necessarily the disciplining) of its own members. That is, if cheap loans need to be provided to anybody it is to those in need in the Emerging Countries, and not to Europeans who have happily spent their own way into difficulty.

In fact, in my New Year questions to Paul Krugman I raised some sort of similar point, but unfortunately his response was not exactly positive.

E.H.: One of the standard pieces of economic observation about countries recovering from financial crises is that their recoveries are export driven. This has now almost attained the status of a stylised fact. But as you starkly ask, at a time when the financial crisis is generalised across all developed economies - whether because those who borrowed the money now have difficulty paying back, or those who leant it now struggle to recover the money owed them - to which new planet are we all going to export? Maybe we don’t need to look so far afield. Many developing economies badly need cheap and responsible credit lines, and access to state-of-the-art technologies. Do you think there is room for some sort of New Marshall Plan initiative, to generate a win-win dynamic for all of us?

P.K.: Um, no. Not realistically as a political matter. We’ll be lucky if we can get the surplus developing countries to spend on themselves. My guess is that our best hope for recovery lies in environmental investment: taking on climate change could, in terms of the macroeconomic impact, be the functional equivalent of a major new technology.

So the solution to our problems is not politically realistic. And meantime we keep trying to play around with policies which simply won't work. It is now pretty clear to me at least just how so much valuable time was lost back in the 1930s, thrashing around playing with solutions which didn't, and wouldn't, work. As Krugman himself likes to say, "history has a habit of repeating itself, the first time as tragedy, and the second time as yet another tragedy".

Waiting For Something To Turn Up: Europe's Looming Pensions-based Sovereign Debt Crisis

As Irwin Stelzer argued in a recent opinion article in the Wall Street Journal, Spain’s Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero seems to be an admirer of Charles Dickens's character Mr. Micawber. When asked what he plans to do about Spain’s 11.4% fiscal deficit, first he promises to extend the retirement age, only to later tell us the measure may not be necessary. Then he promises a public-sector wage freeze, only to have his Economy Minister, Elena Salgado, say he really doesn't mean exactly what he seems to say. And in any event, we shouldn’t worry too much, since given that Spain is a serious country, somehow or other the fiscal deficit will be cut to 3% by 2013, even though most serious analysts consider the economic growth numbers on which the budget plans are based to have their origins more in the dreams of an Alice long lost in Wonderland than in any kind of sobre analysis of real possibilities. "We do have a plan," deputy prime minister, Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega assures us, but to many that plan now seems to be little better than hoping, like the proverbial Mr. Micawber, that "something will turn up."

The lastest to draw attention, to the problematic nature of this "wait and see" approach - and to the gaping hole which is now yawning in Spain’s national balance sheet - is the credit ratings agency Fitch, who only last week warned that many Western governments now face unsustainable debt dynamics following measures taken to address the financial crisis.

The agency singled out Britain, France and Spain as being in special and urgent need of outlining plans to strengthen their public finances if they don’t want to risk losing their current highly prized AAA ranking.

This strong and direct warning was issued by Brian Coulton, Head of Global Economics at Fitch, who said "High-grade sovereign governments need to articulate more credible and stronger fiscal consolidation plans during the course of 2010 to underpin confidence in the sustainability of public finances over the medium-term and their commitment to low and stable inflation. The UK, Spain and France in particular must outline more credible fiscal consolidation programmes over the coming year given the pace of fiscal deterioration and the budgetary challenges they face in stabilising public debt."

Yet, while criticising Portugal's gradual approach to fiscal consolidation as a matter of "concern" Fitch senior director Paul Rawkins also argued that the Spanish govenment had acted swiftly in announcing plans to consolidate public finances. Nonetheless he did still warn that the economic risks facing Spain remain very high, especially since the pace of decline in tax revenues is dramatic enough to be preoccupying, while continuing “labour market inflexibilities could well prolong the economic adjustment”.

The current problem facing Spain (and other similarly affected countries) has its roots in two quite distinct sources. In the first place measures taken to counteract the impact of the financial crisis have been inadequate and have simply produced large short term deficits. However to this short term liquidity and adjustment problem must now be added the further dimension of longer term impacts on public finances which have their origins lie in ageing populations, and the effect on economic growth of having older and smaller working-age populations.


Regarding the first, as Willem Buiter, now chief economist at Citi has pointed out, more than 40 per cent of global GDP is currently being produced in countries (overwhelmingly advanced economies) running fiscal deficits of 10 per cent of GDP or more. Over most of the last 30 years, this level fluctuated in the 0-5 per cent range and was dominated by debt form emerging economies. So the crisis marks a watershed, from which there will likely be no turning back, and in many ways could not have come at a worse moment for those countries who still have to undertake substantial pension reform to put their nation finances on a solid footing when faced with the unprecedented ageing which lies ahead.

Indeed, to take the Greek case, while the short term fiscal deficit has been the focus of most of the press attention, the longer term problem associated with the funding of Greek pensions far outweighs issues associated with the falsifying of national accounts in the early years of this century. A recent report by the European Commission found that Greek spending on pensions and health care for its ageing population, if left unchecked, would soar from just over 20 percent of GDP today to around 37 percent of G.D.P. by 2060. And Greece is simply an early warning indicator of troubles to yet to come, in larger countries like Germany, France, Spain and Italy who have all relied for decades on pay as you go type state-financed pension schemes. Now, governments across Europe are being pressed to re-examine their commitments to providing generous pensions over extended retirements because fiscal issues associated with the downturn have suddenly pushed at least part of these previously hidden costs up to the surface.

In fact, unfunded pension liabilities far outweigh the high levels of official sovereign debt. According to research by Jagadeesh Gokhale, an economist at the Cato Institute in Washington, bringing Greece’s pension obligations onto its balance sheet would show that the government’s debt is in reality equal to something like 875 percent of its gross domestic product. That would be the highest debt level in the 16-nation euro zone, and far above Greece’s official debt level of 113 percent. Other countries have obscured their total obligations as well. In France, where the official debt level is 76 percent of economic output, total debt rises to 549 percent once all of its current pension promises are taken into account. Similarly, in Germany, the current debt level of 69 percent would soar to 418 percent. Of course, these numbers are arguable, and may well be in the excessively high range, but the fact still remains: outstanding and unfunded liabilities are huge, and would have been difficult to honour even without the present crisis. As it is, we are now in danger of spending the seedcorn which could have been harvested later on down the road.

Public opinion has yet to assimilate the seriousness of the issues involved here. As Pimco Chief Executive Mohamed El-Erian said in a recent FT Opinion article, the importance of the shock to public finances in advanced economies is not yet sufficiently appreciated and understood. With time, this issue will prove to be highly consequential. The latest Fitch report is simply another warning shot. The sooner we all recognise the, the greater the probability of our being able to stay ahead of the disruptions this adjustment to reality will cause. It is time to stop simply waiting around to see what is going to turn up, since if we do continue like this we won’t like what we eventually find.

Serious Problems Emerge For The F-UK-De Group Of Countries

Well, I for one can't help thinking that it's now well time we all stopped getting carried away with the use of so many acronyms. Not only may one man's meat easily prove to be another's poison, it may even be that for some the entire meal will be so distasteful as to prove totally indigestable. And so it is with the latest set of proposals to appear on that diagnostic lab bench which has been hastily erected in the search for that magic "cure all" for the eurozone's many ills.

Daniel Gros, in a well meaning, but I feel fatally flawed, move to get us all away from talking about some of the members of our own community as if they were PIGS, has decided to tell us that they are not pigs at all, they are merely GIPSYs. Of course, depending on which way you look at it, such forms of reference could be taken as a compliment ("you sure do eat like a pig"), or not, but stopping to think for a moment about the kind of controversy which has been provoked by the arrival of large numbers of Roma in Italy, perhaps telling the countries which lie on Europe's periphery that the best way to conceptualise them is as a bunch of "gitanos" is not the best way to get reasoned debate going. Nor is it necessarily the best way to do this to tell the members of core Europe that they as things stand they are essentially F-UK-De. But there it is. That's just how things are these days.

Just What Is The Real Level Of Government Debt In Europe?

“If you don’t fully understand an instrument, don’t buy it.”

To the above advice from Emilio Botín, Executive Chairman of Spain’s Grupo Santander, I would simply add one small rider: Don’t sell it either, especially if you are a national government trying to structure your country’s debt.

In a fascinating article in today's New York Times, journalists Louise Story, Landon Thomas and Nelson Schwartz begin to recount the mirky story of just how the major US investment banks have been able to earn considerable sums of money effectively helping European governments to disguise their growing mountain of public debt.

Wall Street tactics akin to the ones that fostered subprime mortgages in America have worsened the financial crisis shaking Greece and undermining the euro by enabling European governments to hide their mounting debts.

As worries over Greece rattle world markets, records and interviews show that with Wall Street’s help, the nation engaged in a decade-long effort to skirt European debt limits. One deal created by Goldman Sachs helped obscure billions in debt from the budget overseers in Brussels.

Even as the crisis was nearing the flashpoint, banks were searching for ways to help Greece forestall the day of reckoning. In early November — three months before Athens became the epicenter of global financial anxiety — a team from Goldman Sachs arrived in the ancient city with a very modern proposition for a government struggling to pay its bills, according to two people who were briefed on the meeting. The bankers, led by Goldman’s president, Gary D. Cohn, held out a financing instrument that would have pushed debt from Greece’s health care system far into the future, much as when strapped homeowners take out second mortgages to pay off their credit cards.

In fact, concerns about what it is exactly Goldman Sachs have been up to in Greece are not new, and the Financial Times have been pusuing this story for some time, in particular in connection with the investment bank's ill fated attempt to persuade the Chinese to buy Greek government debt (and here, and here). Nor is the fact that the Greek government resorted to sophistocated financial instruments to cover its tracks exactly breaking news, since I (among others) have been writing about this topic since the middle of January - Does Anyone Really Know The Size Of The Greek 2009 Deficit? - following the arrival in my inbox of a leaked copy of the report the Greek Finance Minister sent to the EU Commission detailing the issues.

What is new in today's report from the NYT team is the extent to which they identify the problem as a much more general one, involving more banks and more countries, since "Instruments developed by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and a wide range of other banks enabled politicians to mask additional borrowing in Greece, Italy and possibly elsewhere". I very strongly suggest that our NYT stalwarts take a long hard look at what has been going on in Spain, and especially at the Autonomous Community level.

So the question naturally arises, just how much in debt are our governments, really? As the NYT team point out, Eurostat has long been grappling with this matter, and as far back as 2002 they found themselves forced to change their accounting rules, in order to try to enforce the disclosure of many off-balance sheet entities that had previously escaped detection by the EU, since up to that point the transactions involved had been classified as asset "sales", often of public buildings and the like. Following advice paid for from the best of investment banks many European governments simply responded to the rule change by reformulating their suspect deals as loans rather than outright sales. As we say in Spain "hecha la ley, hecha la trampa" (or in English, when you close one loophole you open another). According to the NYT authors:

"As recently as 2008, Eurostat.... reported that “in a number of instances, the observed securitization operations seem to have been purportedly designed to achieve a given accounting result, irrespective of the economic merit of the operation.”"

So just what is all the fuss about. Well, in plain and simple terms it is about an accounting item known as "receivables". Now, according to the Wikipedia entry:

"Accounts receivable (A/R) is one of a series of accounting transactions dealing with the billing of a customers for goods and services received by the customers. In most business entities this is typically done by generating an invoice and mailing or electronically delivering it to the customer, who in turn must pay it within an established timeframe called credit or payment terms."

However, as we can learn from another Wikpedia entry, often the use of "accounts receivable" constitutes a form of factoring, and this is where the problems Eurostat are concerned about actually start:

Factoring is a financial transaction whereby a business sells its accounts receivable (i.e., invoices) to a third party (called a factor) at a discount in exchange for immediate money with which to finance continued business. Factoring differs from a bank loan in three main ways. First, the emphasis is on the value of the receivables (essentially a financial asset), not the firm’s credit worthiness. Secondly, factoring is not a loan – it is the purchase of a financial asset (the receivable). Finally, a bank loan involves two parties whereas factoring involves three.

But how does all this work in practice? Well, the World Wide Web is a wonderful thing, since you have so much information near to hand, at just the twitch of a fingertip. Here is a useful description of what are known as PPI/PFI schemes, from UK building contractor John Laing:

A Public Private Partnership (PPP) is an umbrella term for Government schemes involving the private business sector in public sector projects.

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is a form of PPP developed by the Government in which the public and private sectors join to design, build or refurbish, finance and operate (DBFO) new or improved facilities and services to the general public. Under the most common form of PFI, a private sector provider like John Laing will, through a Special Purpose Company (SPC), hold a DBFO contract for facilities such as hospitals, schools, and roads according to specifications provided by public sector departments. Over a typical period of 25-30 years, the private sector provider is paid an agreed monthly (or unitary) fee by the relevant public body (such as a Local Council or a Health Trust) for the use of the asset(s), which at that time is owned by the PFI provider. This and other income enables the repayment of the senior debt over the concession length. (Senior debt is the major source of funding, typically 90% of the required capital, provided by banks or bond finance). Asset ownership usually returns to the public body at the end of the concession. In this manner, improvements to public services can be made without upfront public sector funds; and while under contract, the risks associated with such huge capital commitments are shared between parties, allocated appropriately to those best able to manage each one.

And for those still in the dark, Wikipedia just one more time comes to the rescue:

The private finance initiative (PFI) is a method to provide financial support for "public-private partnerships" (PPPs) between the public and private sectors. Developed initially by the Australian and United Kingdom governments, PFI has now also been adopted (under various guises) in Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, and the United States (amongst others) as part of a wider program for privatization and deregulation driven by corporations, national governments, and international bodies such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank.

PFI contracts are currently off-balance-sheet, meaning that they do not show up as part of the national debt as measured by government statistics such as the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). The technical reason for this is that the government authority taking out the PFI contract pays a single charge (the 'Unitary Charge') for both the initial capital spend and the on-going maintenance and operation costs. This means that the entire contract is classed as revenue spending rather than capital spending. As a result neither the capital spend nor the long-term revenue obligation appears on the government's balance sheet. Were the total PFI liability to be shown on the UK balance sheet it would greatly increase the UK national debt.

And here are two more examples of what is involved which were brought to light by a quick Google. First of all, the case of Italian health payments. Now according to analysts Patrizio Messina and Alessia Denaro, in this report I found online from Financial Consultants Orrick:

In the last years many structured finance transactions (either securitisation transactions or asset finance transactions) have been structured in relation to the so called healthcare receivables.The reasons are several. On one side, the providers of healthcare goods and services usually are not paid in time by the relevant healthcare authorities and therefore, in order to gain liquidity, usually assign their receivables toward the healthcare authorities. On the other side, due to the recent legislation that provides for very high interest rates on late payments, the debtors as well as banks and other investors have had the same and opposite interest on carrying out different kind of transactions. In this brief article we will analyse, after a quick description of the Italian healthcare system, some of the different structures that have been used in relation to transactions concerning healthcare receivables and, in particular, we will focus on transactions concerning the so called “raw receivables”, which are lately increasing in the Italian market practice, by analysing the legal means through which it is possible to ascertain/recover such receivables.

This system thus has two advantages (apart from the fact that it effectively hides debt). In the first place the healthcare providers gain liquidity in order to continue to run hospitals, pay doctors, etc, while those who effectively intermediate the transaction earn very high interest rates for their efforts, interest payments which have to be deducted from next years health care provision, and so on.

As the Orrick report points out, Italy’s national healthcare service (servizio sanitarionazionale, “nhs”) is regulated by the legislative decree of December 30, 1992, no. 502 (“decree 502/92”).The reform introduced by decree 502/92, as amended from time to time, provides for a three-tier system for the healthcare service, as outlined below: State level The central government provides a national legislation limited to very general features of the NHS and decides the funds to be allocated to the single regions according to specific criteria (density of population, etc.) for the NHS.

As the Orrick analysts note: "the Healthcare Authorities usually pay the relevant Providers with a certain delay".

Usually, when healthcare funds are allocated, in the national provisional budget, the central government underestimates the amount of healthcare expenditure. Since the central government does not provide regions with enough funds, regions are not able to provide enough funds to Healthcare Authorities, and payments to the Providers are delayed. Since the Providers need liquidity, they usually assign their receivables toward the Healthcare Authorities. To deal with all the above issues, Italian market practice has been developing an alternative system of financing through securitisation and asset finance transactions of Healthcare Receivables.

As the analysts finally conclude:

Despite of the risks concerning the judicial proceedings, Italian market players are still very interested on carrying on securitisation transaction on this kind of asset, principally because Legislative Decree no. 231/02 provides for very high interest rates on late payments (equal to the interest rate applied by ECB plus 7%) - my emphasis

Another technique Eurostat have identified as a means of concealing debt relates to the recording of military equipment expenditure, as described in this report I found dating from 2006. At the time Eurostat were worried about the growing provision of military equipment under leasing agreements. Basically they decided that such provision was debt accumulable.

Eurostat has decided that leases of military equipment organised by the private sector should be considered as financial leases, and not as operating leases. This supposes recording an acquisition of equipment by the government and the incurrence of a government liability to the lessor. Thus there is an impact on government deficit and debt at the time that the equipment is put at the disposal of the military authorities, and not at the time of payments on the lease. Those payments are then assimilated as debt servicing, with a part recorded as interest and the remainder as a financial transaction.

However, a loophole was found in the case of long term equipment purchases:

Military equipment contracts often involve the gradual delivery over many years of a number of the same or similar pieces of equipment, such as aircraft or armoured vehicles, or including significant service components, such as training. Moreover, in the case of complex systems, it is frequently the case that some completion tasks need to be performed for the equipment to be operational at full potential capacity. Some military programmes are based on the combination of several kinds of equipment that may be completed in different periods, so that the expenditure may be spread over several fiscal years before the system, globally considered, becomes fully operational.

In cases of long-term contracts where deliveries of identical items are staged over a long period of time, or where payments cover the provision of both goods and services, government expenditure should be recorded at the time of the actual delivery of each independent part of the equipment, or of the provision of service.

Payment for such items are only to be classifed as debt at the time of registering the actual delivery, which may explain why, if my information is correct, the Greek military as of last December were still officially "testing" two submarines which had been provided by German contractors, since final delivery had still to be formally registered, and the debt accounted.

A lot of information about the kind of things which were going on before the 2006 rule change can be found in this online presentation from Europlace Financial Forum. Here are some examples of private/public sector cooperation in Italy.



And here's a chart showing a list of advantages and possible applications:



Now, at the end of the day, you may ask "what is wrong with all of this"? Well quite simply, like Residential Mortgage Backed Securities these are instruments that work while they work, and cause a lot of additional headaches when they don't. I can think of three reasons why debt aquired in this way in the past may now be problematic.

a) they assume a certain level of headline GDP growth to furnish revenue growth to the public agencies committed to making the payments. Following the crisis these previous levels of assumed growth are now unlikely to be realised.
b) they assume growing workforces and working age populations, but both these, as we know, are now likely to start declining in many European countries.
c) they assume unchanging dependency ratios between active and dependent populations, but these assumptions, as we also already know, are no longer valid, as our population pyramids steadily invert.

Given all this, a very real danger exists that what were previously considered as obscure securitisation instruments, so obscure that few politicians really understood their implications, and few citizens actually knew of their existence, can suddenly find themselves converted into little better than a glorified Ponzi scheme.

And if you want one very concrete example of how unsustainable debt accumulation can lead to problems, you could try reading this report in the Spanish newspaper La Verdad (Spanish, but Google translate if you are interested), where they recount the problems being faced by many Spanish local authorities who are now running out of money, in this case it the village of San Javier they have until the 24 February to pay a debt of 350,000 euros, or the electricity will simply be cut off! The article also details how many other municipalities are having increasing difficulty in paying their employees. And this is just in one region (Murcia), but the problem is much more general, as Spain's heavily overindebted local authorities and autonomous communities steadily grind to a halt.

Few Surprises As Greece's Economic Contraction Accelerates

Well, I may say there were no surprises, but in fact the Greek economy contracted more than many observers expected in the fourth quarter, while downward revisions to the rest of 2009 converted the present recession into the country's worst since 1987. Evidently the latest numbers offer the first warning that all may not be as simple as it looks on paper for the Greek government's plan to set their finances straight. As far as I am concerned the latest numbers simply confirm what should already have been abundantly evident - correcting the fiscal deficit without straightening out the rest of the economic distortions is going to make economic growth something which is very hard to come by.

Accelerating Contraction

According to the Greek National Statistics Office gross domestic product contracted by 0.8 percent in the fourth quarter, significantly more than the 0.5 percent drop forecast in a Reuters survey of economists. The data clearly reveal that Greece's downturn actually picked up speed from a revised 0.5 percent in the third quarter, casting doubt over government estimates of a return to growth in the second part of this year, and raising yet more issues about the evolution of the debt to GDP ratio.

On a year-on-year basis, the economy shrank 2.6 percent in the fourth quarter following a revised fall of 2.5 percent in the third. The sweeping data revision showed Greek GDP contracted by 2 percent in 2009 as a whole, considerably more than the government's earlier 1.2 percent estimate, making for the worst annual performance in nearly 30 years.

The latest batch of data changes only serve to further undermine the government's already badly dented statistical credibility, even if the Greeks are far from being alone in carrying out this type of revision. But it is the scale of the revisions which is so striking in the Greek case - GDP shrank, for example, by a quarter-on-quarter 1 percent in the first quarter of last year: twice the earlier estimate, and the sharpest quarterly contraction since 2005. In the second quarter, GDP fell 0.3 percent, compared with an earlier estimate of a 0.1 percent, while third-quarter GDP shrank 0.5 percent revised from the earlier estimate of 0.4 percent. Rather than leaving the impression that government GDP figures are "doctored" what the revisions suggest is that the government actually has little real idea of what is going on in the economy at any given moment in time, a conclusion I personally find even more disturbing.

The revisions will also push up the figure for Greece’s budget deficit last year, possibly by 0.1 percent, leaving the current "final, final figure" standing at something like 12.8 percent while the debt to GDP ratio may increase 1.2 percentage points to 114.6 percent. But then the Greek Finance Ministry have just amended the 2009 fiscal cash execution data they provide on their website, and have added close to 6 billion Euro to the December expenditure number, making for a final total of 11.8 billion Euro for the month.

This number takes the full-year deficit to 37.9 billionn - up from the 29.4 billion Euro previously reported, with the implication that there will be a further substantial increase in the 2009 central government budget deficit. To date no explanation has been offered for the revision, although a good guess would be it is associated with the payment hospital supply arrears, in which case the general government deficit may well have been proportionately reduced. As I pointed out in this post, even after all the glare of public scrutiny considerable uncertainty still surrounds the 2009 deficit number, and the latest revision is just one more stunning example of the kind of payments changes which one can find made without further explanation. As I say, the biggest doubt here isn't the sincerity of the numbers, but the ability of the government itself to control what actually happens.

Little Relief In Sight

While the current pace of GDP contraction may slow somewhat there is little actual hope for a real and sustainable return to growth in the Greek economy in the forseeable future, and especially as the impact of the fiscal correction starts to bite. Unsurprisingly Greek industrial output continued its fall in December, and was down 2% from November.


And the January PMI suggested that the contraction in industrial output continues and may even be accelerating.

Commenting on the Greece Manufacturing PMI survey data, Gemma Wallace, economist at Markit said:

“The onset of the new year brought little hope of a near-term recovery in Greek manufacturing. Accelerating contractions in new orders, output and employment caused the headline PMI to sink to an eight-month low. Meanwhile, firms were struggling to cover rising costs, as strong competition and unfavourable demand conditions rendered them unable to raise charges.

Domestic demand also shows few signs of life, and retail sales are falling steadily.


As are new car sales.

While Greece has not had the kind of private credit boom that countries like Spain and Ireland have seen (in terms of the levels of indebtedness) credit was increasing at an annual rate of over 20% before the crisis hit, and this boom in borrowing has now clearly run out of steam.

But in fact there was no bubble in house prices in Greece.

And private construction activity (housebuilding) has been falling since 2003.


Nonethless a very substantial current account deficit was created, as the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industry wilted.

This deficit has been reducing, but both goods and services exports have been falling, so there would seem to be little likelihood at this point of a tourism-driven economic expansion.



Europe's Tough Love May Be More Substantial Than It Seems At First Sight

Rumours still abound regarding the possibility of an eventual EU bailout package. The central scenario still remains the same, namely that money will be made available eventually, as and when needed (probably by end of March), even if the precise mechanism to be used is not yet clear. Speculation continues that the IMF may well play some sort of role, although, again, at this point in time it is far from clear what precise form their participation might take. US economist Jeffery Frankey this week added his name to the long list of those who have now come out in favour of a role for the fund (I have long had my name on the venerable list), and makes at least one novel argument: that core Europe, far from expressing their reservations about a hypothetical IMF role, should in fact be only too happy to welcome one.

Europeans worry that if Greece were put into default, troubles in Portugal and Spain would appear as quickly as heads on a hydra. Perhaps it is glib for an American, on the other side of the Atlantic, to discount the financial strains that Greece is placing on Europe — including Mediterranean contagion, loss of prestige of European institutions, and depreciation of the euro. But in fact it is the northern Europeans who should be most eager for the IMF to come in. They should be the most worried about what they are going to say to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland, if instead they have just bailed out Greece.

Meanwhile the IMF itself continues to wait courteously on the sidelines, limiting itself to stating, as IMF First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky put it this weekend, that the Fund "is willing to support Greece as thought appropriate by the Greek authorities".

And judging by the latest statements by Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, thinking is something the Greek administration will be doing a lot of in the coming days, especially after the recent demonstration of "tough love" (lots of words but little tangible support) from their European counterparts. Papandreou reportedly criticised the European Union's response to the country's financial crisis as "timid and too slow" in a televised cabinet meeting in Athens on Friday. He also asserted that the EU lacked coordination, and had effectively undermined Greece's credibility. Speaking on his return from Brussels, Mr Papandreou said that while Greece had received a statement of support, delays and conflicting statements over the past few months had actually served to make matters worse. "But in the battle against the impressions and the psychology of the market, it [the EU response] was at the very least timid, " the BBC report him as saying.

Basically Papandreou's comments are completely out of place, even if they are intended for domestic consumption. It was always unrealistic for Europe's political leaders to agree to more than general guidelines for how a rescue plan might take place at last week's meeting. A firm commitment was virtually impossible, partly because some of the possible solutions - bilateral lending, for example - would very likely have to be approved by the relevant national parliaments, if support was to go anywhere beyond small token sums.

An important list of outstanding issues still need to be decided, including (1) the size of any eventual loan or guarantee; (2) the extent of burden sharing between the other Eurogroup countries (Germany and France are expected to be the heavyweights but others will surely participate as well); (3) the terms of the loan (whether it is only to be short term - 6 months has been mentioned); and (4) the precise terms of conditionality (conditions are expected to be tough, and include specific commitments on what to do if programme execution falls short of estimated objectives.)

Given the complexity of all this, and the amount of fine tuning still to be carried out, it is hardly suprising that nothing substantial was announced, and especially given the fact that the Eurogroup are entering into what effectively consitutes new institutional terrain, while France and Germany, for example, may be very reticent to get too far involved with their Southern neighbours at the cost of loosening ties with - say - the UK and Sweden, which is why Frankel may have a very solid point.

The Planned Correction Simply Is Just Not Doable As Things Stand

Nothing is going to change the fact that if Greece really does tighten fiscal policy by 3 or 4 percentage points of GDP over the next four years, growth is going to be almost non-existent. This is going to be a long hard slog and providing a temporary bridging loan to guarantee Greece’s solvency this year will not avoid the fact that the same will be needed next year, the year after and the year after that.
Societe Generale, The Economic News

As is by now very well known Greece has one of the highest government debt levels as percentage of GDP among the OECD countries. The government’s gross debt burden is expected to rise sharply to 135% in 2012, based on the latest EU Commission projections - up from 99% in 2008. This rise is driven by ongoing fiscal deficits, which hit a minimum of 12.7% in 2009, as a result of the unexpectedly large size of Greece's economic downturn. The deficit is expected to continue to be large in 2011 - as a result of the continuing shortfall in tax revenues. On the government’s own estimates the budget deficit is expected to remain significantly above the EU budget deficit ceiling of 3% until 2012. Thus the Greek government will have substantial borrowing requirements through 2012, with something like €45.2billion gross issuance being needed in 2010 (in addition to the recently issued €8billionn of 5-year GGB’s) and a further €45 billion or so in 2011.



Greece’s Stability and Growth Programme (SGP), which was submitted to the EC on January 14, 2010, is ambitious both in terms of magnitude and given Greece’s track record in fiscal consolidation. The plan aims for a reduction in the fiscal deficit of 10.7 percentage points of GDP over four years, from 12.7% of GDP in 2009, to 2% of GDP in 2013. This magnitude of fiscal consolidation is unprecedented in Europe and raises questions regarding the credibility of the plan - in light of Greece’s poor track record in fiscal consolidation that failed in the past due to lack of political commitment. The plan also assumes a GDP growth rate well in excess of EC and IMF forecasts. According to Dan Lustig (lead analyst in Mitsubishi UFJ's Greece team) who prepared the above chart the plan’s implementation will be "very challenging, given Greece’s large public sector, weak economic growth prospects and the potential for social upheaval, due to the necessity for significant public sector expenditure cuts".


Appendix - A Hard Package To Implement

The main guidelines of the new tax bill and the key themes regarding the Government’s income policy to be introduced into the Parliament for voting in the upcoming days were recently released by the Finance Ministry. These include:

Tax Measures

The upper tax rate of 40% will be applied on annual incomes above €60,000. This will replace the existing €75,000 threshold. The new tax scale implies tax cuts to annual incomes below €40,000 and increases for incomes above this sum. The government have created 6 new
tax brackets for incomes between €12,000 and €60,000, and tax levels will range from 18% to
38%. The progressive character of the tax scale is basically aimed at transferring tax burdens to higher income groups, while alleviating tax burdens from low income categories. Incomes ranging from €12,000 to €16,000 are to be taxed at 18% as compared with the current 24% tax rate on incomes ranging from €12,000 to €30,000. Since around 95% of individual tax records show incomes below €30,000 this implies that low income groups should be less affected by the changes in the tax scale, although it is important to bear in mind that there is probably widespread underreporting of income.

Interestingly the €12,000 tax-free income bracket includes a provision that tax payers need to submit receipts for goods and services in order to qualify. This measure has the objective of helping the tax service crosscheck data and encourages individuals to demand VAT denominated invoices for purchases.

There will be:

- an increase in the fuel tax rate which aims to boost revenues by €934 million in 2010.
- an annual tax rate increase on real estate held by offshore firms (rising to 10% vs. the current 3%).
- A Tremonti type tax amnesty whereby undeclared bank accounts deposits outside Greece can be repatriated at a 5% tax rate for 6 months after the bill is put into effect so long as the money is transferred into 1-year term deposits.
- the introduction of a new progressive tax scale on large real estate holdings valued
above €400,000
- VAT will be applied to a wider category of transactions, and electronic cash registers will be obligatory in an increased number of designated activities (including gas stations, kiosk, taxis, and street markets). Such measures are expected to significantly boost VAT revenues, since many professional activities (like lawyers and doctors) were previously largely exempted from the 19% VAT system.

Regarding the income policy (which will be retroactive and applied to 2010 incomes for employees in the public sector in the widest sense of this term):

- civil servants’ wages will be frozen in 2010, although seniority pay increases will be applied as usual.

- there will be a 10% cut in civil servants’ allowances. Contrary to earlier announcements, the cut in allowances in public sector will not be proportional to the employee’s income (i.e. greater cut for high income groups and lower cut for lower income employees). According to press reports, the decision to apply a uniform 10% cut in allowances across the board was due to the legal impediments to doing it any other way. Nevertheless, the allowance cut, as well as the wage freeze measure, are the key instruments for the government effectively lowering the wage bill of the budget in 2010, in its effort to control government spending.
- As a consequence, the gross monthly income of public sector employees will decline by as much as 5.5%.
- The upper limit for overtime payment is reduced by 30%. - State sector pensioners will get an increase of 1.5%, in line with government’s inflation forecast for 2010 of 1.4%. Pensioners earning more than EUR 2,000 on a monthly basis will get no increase.
- There will be a hiring freeze for the public sector for 2010 (partially excluding the health, education and security sectors), and an application of the rule of 1 replacement for every 5 people who leave from 2011 onwards. Furthermore, a widespread re-allocation of civil servants will be instigated, along with the consolidation of much public enterprise, in order to increase the effectiveness of public administration.

Most of the measures announced were included in the Stability & Growth Programme and are consistent with the government’s earlier announcements.

The Labour Ministry has also announced that it is planning to raise the retirement age as part of changes aimed at amend and support the state-run pension system. The Minister highlighted that unless a reform is implemented the pension system will face serious funding problems by 2015. The proposals which will be sent to the committee of experts and social partners charged with drafting the pension reform bill include the following:

- Increase by 2 years of the effective average retirement age to 63 years of age by 2015.
- Abolishing all incentives to early retirement.
- Encouraging workers to stay on the job longer,
- Separating the health-care and pension systems, with the former being incorporated
into the National Health System.
- Harmonisation of the male and female retirement age in the public sector, in line with
EU directives.
- The establishment of an independent entity overseen by the Central bank to manage social-
security fund reserves.

Greece Gets The Green Light, But Will It All Work?

Well, as reported over the weekend on this blog, the EU Commission did in fact demand "more sacrifices" from the Greek people, and in the end Prime Minister Papandreou had to make a last minute TV appearance to explain to his incredulous listeners that the time had come "to take brave decisions here in Greece just as other countries in Europe have also taken....We all have a debt and duty towards our homeland to work together at this difficult time to protect our economy." I thought that that time had come last November, but evidently I was precipitate in my judgement, but now it has finally arrived, although I ould note that hope does spring eternal, and that even now not everyone is 100% convinced.

When Adreas Papandreou said Greece needed the same brave decisions others have taken I presume he was in fact referring to Latvia, Hungary and Romania.

More than the measures themselves, what is interesting about the Brussels acceptance speech were the series of measures put in place to monitor and control Greek economic policy. As the Financial Times put it, the EU puts Athens under close scrutiny.

"The European Commission, the guardian of Europe’s fiscal rules, struck out into uncharted territory by placing Greece’s economic and budgetary policies under closer surveillance than has yet been applied to a eurozone country."

In fact the European Commission has put Athens on an unprecedentedly short leash, since there is to be a mid-March interim progress report, a further one in mid-May, and quarterly updates thereafter. In addition, an infringement procedure was also launched against Athens for "failing in its duty to report reliable budgetary statistics".

The Commission recommendations will now be forwarded to EU finance ministers for possible approval on 15-16 February. If endorsed, it will be the first time that a eurozone member country will be put under such strict surveillance.

And the agreed measures are obviously far from being the end of the road, since the EU executive only conditionally approved Greece's three-year fiscal plan and warned further cuts in public sector wages would be required (that dreaded internal devaluation) if, as many economists believe, the measures so far announced prove to be insufficient to generate the economic growth which will be needed to meet the steep deficit-reduction targets. Thus the die is cast, and Greece will not, as I recommended, be going to the IMF. Such a move is now seen as superflous, since the EU Commission is steadily transforming itself into a local "mini-version" of the Fund in order to try to handle the cases of those countries who show continuing reluctance in implementing those much needed deep structural reforms. I only hope the Commission have the will to follow this through with all the determination that is needed, since if Greece do now finally go to the IMF for help it will surely now be as an ex-member of the Eurogroup.

Not that this weeks session was entirely accident free. Retiring Economy Commissioner Joaquin Almunia gave yet another example of how clumsy he can at times be, by declaring that "En esos países (Greece, Portugal and Spain), observamos una pérdida constante de competitividad desde que son miembros de la zona euro" (a "continuous" loss of competitiveness), which appeared in the English language press as: "Almunia Says South Europe Has ‘Permanent’ Competitiveness Loss". It isn't clear to me from this distance whether he was speaking in English and his core message got "lost in translation", or whether he thought the speech out in Spanish, and the faux pas is down to his advisers. Either way the damage was done, causing even more problems than needed - according to data from CMA datavision, Credit Default Swaps were up on Spanish Sovereign Debt to 151 bps, or up 18.24 on the day. Portugal CDS also rose sharply on the day - 28.47 bps to 195.80.

As Deutsche Bank's Jim Reid said after the announcement:

Clearly aggressive fiscal tightening can look plausible on paper but the reality is that the path will be full of potential roadblocks. Future strike action will be sign of how prepared the general population is to take the hard medicine. The jury must still be out on this and the market will look to exploit any set backs. However in the short-term the market does seem to have lined up an alternative target.

So the jury still is very much out on just how viable the GDP targets being offered by the Greek government really are. George Papaconstantinou, Greece’s finance minister, may have told the Financial Times that he expected a return to economic growth from the middle of this year - boosted, he said, by strength in the shipping and tourism industries and the “hidden power of consumers” in the shadow economy. But saying this is one thing, and achieving it is another. Growth across Europe will at best be modest this year - let's say between 0.5% to 1% of GDP at the most optimistic - with labour markets week everywhere, so I think it is rather unrealistic to expect a tourist boom going much beyond the one we saw (or didn't see) last year, and the same goes for shipping, which is a sector where surplus capacity still abounds. As for those affluent Greek consumers he is talking about, we have to hope they all dig deep into their wallets, and that each and every one of them now insists on a VAT valid invoice!

But so far there is not much sign of this, and retail sales are actually falling steadily (see chart below). In fact I seriously doubt we are going to see much support from internal consumption at this point. Greece is all about exports now, but where are they going to come from? And how is the country going to get a trade surplus big enough to achieve the sort of economic growth they are talking about without a much stronger internal devaluation?



Industrial output has been falling for some time.



And the latest January PMI only served to underline how Greece was becoming detached from the recovery elsewhere.

Commenting on the Greece Manufacturing PMI survey data, Gemma Wallace, economist at Markit said:

“The onset of the new year brought little hope of a near-term recovery in Greek manufacturing. Accelerating contractions in new orders, output and employment caused the headline PMI to sink to an eight-month low. Meanwhile, firms were struggling to cover rising costs, as strong competition and unfavourable demand conditions rendered them unable to raise charges.

Eurozone unemployment hit 10% for the first time in December, underlining the extent to which the timid economic recovery has yet to translate into job creation. Spain's jobless rate rose to nearly 20%, and Ireland, which like Spain has also been hard hit by a housing downturn, saw its jobless rate climb to 13.3% from 13%. As is normal Eurostat didn't have data on the jobless rate in Greece, where, as Market Watch point out, statistics are notoriously hard to come by. The lastest - EU comparable - number we have is for October, but at this point such a data point is the next best thing to useless. A similar situation exists in the construction sector, we have no clear idea of what is happening since the Greek statistics office simply to not supply comparable data to Eurostat.

Meanwhile the drama in the bond markets looks set to trundle on:

Greece's acute problem is the need to raise financing to allow it to roll over maturing debt in April and May, while preserving sufficient cash to fund current expenditure. We estimate an additional funding need of at least €30bn by May. The concentration of maturing debt is unusual, but even if this immediate source of stress can be overcome, the funding profile for coming years remains demanding. The next three months will have a heavy bearing on the profile that is followed, but whatever happens, Greece and other peripheral euro area countries will still suffer from a chronic need to improve productivity, raise national savings and cut government borrowing.
Christel Aranda-Hassel, Director, European Economics, Credit Suisse.

An all the doubt continue as to whether, with the fiscal retrenchment process and the competitiveness correct Greece can manage to achieve the debt to GDP reductions promised in their Stability Programme. As Credit Suisse's Giovanni Zanni puts it, previously

Nominal GDP growth was systematically higher than the average rate of interest paid on the government’s debt. The implication was that the government could run significant fiscal deficits and still reduce the debt-to- GDP ratio. It did not exploit that advantage significantly, however, and the Greek government’s debt ratio fell only slightly over the period. Things have changed drastically since last year. Nominal growth fell to 0% in 2009. Although it should recover from 2009 lows, we think it will remain subdued relative to the recent past. Even if Greek sovereign credit spreads versus Germany fall back somewhat from the peaks reached last week, it seems extremely unlikely that the favourable dynamics of the past will reappear anytime soon. As such, there are few options open to the government other than to move the primary balance into surplus – a surplus that is sufficient to first stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio and then push it downwards.

This primary surplus seems a very, very long way off at this point. And Greek bonds fell again yesterday, pushing the premium investors demand to hold 10-year securities instead of German bunds up by 12 basis points to its highest level in a week. The move followed news that Greece’s biggest union had approved a mass strike while tax collectors began a 48-hour walkout. The Greek 10-year yield jumped 8 basis points to 6.76 percent as of 11:45 a.m. in London. The difference in yield, or spread, with benchmark German bunds was at 365 basis points. It widened to 396 basis points on Jan. 28, the most since before the euro’s debut in 1999.



And Citicorp warns that investors may well continue to cut their holdings of Greek bonds amid skepticism the government can overcome public hostility to budget cuts.


“Although Greece has secured the expected backing from the EU for its latest austerity program, we expect markets to remain very fearful of the potential for the fiscal consolidation process to slide or to be derailed by public dissent,” according to Steve Mansell, director of interest-rate strategy at Citigroup in London. Investors, he said, may be “more prone to lighten exposure on any significant spread tightening moves”.

And it isn't only the bank analysts who are not convinced. According to this article in Le Monde IMF head Dominique Strauss Kahn and his close associate Jean Pisani-Ferry, director of the Brussles based think tank Bruegel also have their doubts:

Celui-ci estime que l'UE n'a ni la vocation, ni les équipes, ni les techniques pour analyser les carences d'un pays et préconiser des remèdes. L'Union n'a pas l'habitude d'affronter l'impopularité des thérapies de choc et pourrait céder aux manifestations de rue. Le FMI peut jouer de sa réputation de dureté pour aider le gouvernement grec à imposer les sacrifices inévitables.

Which in plain English says that they thing the EU Commission has neither the vocation, nor the teams, nor the technical experience to take on a job of this size, and while it is vital that the necessary structures and policy tools are developed, in the meantime the clock is ticking away, and the infection is spreading to the Sovereign Debt of other countries - even as far away as Japan. Basically M. Strauss Kahn seems to feel that the EU Commission is assuming an unnecessarily high risk, and that the Greek dossier should really have been sent to the IMF as a matter of some urgency. I cannot but agree.